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The Fordham Monthly
meet its obligations, nothing more can be required." (See Kujek
v. Goldman, xio N. Y. 176; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 3 Allen (Mass.)
605.) On appeal (174 N. Y. 472) the court of appeals held that
"there is no valid reason for excepting the marriage contract from
the general rule"-i. e., of fraud, as above stated. In this we think
the court erred. In Svenson v. Svenson, 78 A. D. 536; the court
recognizes the general rule that "ill health although concealed or
misrepresented will not itself justify an annulment." Yet the rule
has no application to "a disease which involves contagion in the
marital relation."- (On appeal, 178 N. Y. 54.)
This reasoning is followed in the principal case. The court
took judicial notice of the fact that tuberculosis is such a disease
that "through the close tie of the marital relation grave and disastrous results from infection may be caused.to the other party and
possible evil consequences to the offspring of such a marriage.'
It is imperative that this doctrine be not extended too far. The
facts of the principal case are apparently strong. There was art
actual misrepresentation to an inquiry. Whether the nature of his
disease imposed a positive duty upon him to make it known, is not
in issue. (Am. & F-ng. Encyc. 14, p. 69-71.) A physician testified
that defendant is incurable. The danger of annulling a marriage
upon a physician's opinion is very obvious. Cohabitation lasted
for a few days and ceased immediately upon discovery of the fraud.
The court does not go into the question whether reasonable prudence could have discovered the nature of the disease.
The dangers of collusion are great. There was no defense
offered in the principal case. There is, therefore, little likelihood of
an appeal; the decision, though in its nature exparte, will serve as
a precedent.

BOOK REVIEWS.
BRAD1BURY' PLEADING AND PRAcTICE REPORTS, VOLUME 3,
edited by Harry B. Bradbury (The Banks Law Publishing Co.).
Reviewers, we think, may be separated into two classes. The
attitude of one class is typified by that of William Style, who, as
long ago as 1658, wrote the "The Epistle Dedicatory," which is prefixed to his reports, that "the Press hath been verv fertile in this
our Age, and hath brought forth many, if not too many births of
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this nature." The other class is imbued with the spirit of that
great master of the intricate art of pleading, Baron Parke, who,
as Serjeant Ballantyne informs us in his recollections, sacrificed
promptness at dinner on the altar of a fine point of demurrer. As
for us, we trust we are not so oblivious to the toil incident to the
preparation of a book for the legal profession as to receive it ungraciously, after the manner, whether real or affected, of reviewers
of the former class.
Mr. Bradbury's latest addition to his series of reports is one to
delight the heart and mind of a Baron Parke. It is filled to-overflowing, like " a gift-ship to Belgium," with decisions which adjudge points in pleading and practice that are of great interest and
extreme nicety. The usefulness of the book is enhanced by the addition (e. g., page 3, etseq., and page I6, etseq.), of exhaustive
notes. The work, of course, is designed purely for members of the
bar. But we venture the opinion that familiarity with its pages will
compensate the law-student for his labor, for, as it was anciently
quaintly said (Co. Litt., §534), "know, my son, that it is one of the
most honorable, laudable, and profitable things in our law, to have
the science of well pleading in actions reals and personals: and
therefore I counsaile thee especially to imploy thy courage and care
to learn this."
We cannot but commend an undertaking such as this, that will
put in enduring form many of the short decisions now preserved in
The New York Law Journal. which illuminate the path to judgment. The utility of printing charges of trial judges is open to
doubt. As a rule. they are extemporaneous. and lack. however accomplished the deliverer, that acute analysis which is the fruit of
discriminating research and long meditation. On the other hand,
we heartily approve of the idea of following an opinion with the
peladings. orders and other forms, discussed by the court or used
by counsel.
If Mr. Bradburv has erred in the discharge of his editorial
duties, his failings mav be said to be ne,,ative rather than positive.
Perhaps we exwect too much of him If so. his is the fault, and
his admirable "Rule of Pleading" the proximate cause thereof.
Apropos of Cafie Mav Glass Co. v. Jetter Bre-wina Cn.. (City
Ct.. 19T2). at page 34. which held that a denial of knowledge or
information. etc.. is frivolous, if interposed by a corporation sued
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ior goods sold and delivered. Apparently, the learned editor has
overlooked Scranton & Lehigh Coal Co. v. Hetkin & Co.,78 Misc.
512, 138 N. Y. Supp. 617 (192), a case where such a denial was
declared to be proper by a court sitting, to use the dictum of MacLean, I., across the "affluent East river, which often divides law
and practice. as did the Mahratta ditch, upon one brink of which the
widow's suttee was commended to and of the pious, while on'the
other it was abhorrent to the law and religion." (Baum v. Elias,
64 Misc. 43, 44, 117 N. Y. Supp. 935 [1907].) While we think the
Cape May case (supra) is impeccably correct, attorneys in the Second Judicial Department, we believe, will continue to treat the
Scranton case (supra) as binding upon them, until it is overruled.
Is Florsheim v. Berlinger (City Ct., 1911), at page 40, sound?
With us, the taint of usury will render a note void, as between
the immediate parties thereto, to say the least. Where then a defendant tacitly admits the making and existence of a note (which
means, to be sure, nothing less than a valid note), by omitting to
deny the plaintiff's allegations thereof, logical consistency would
seem to require that that defendant should be precluded thereby
from thereafter setting forth the defense of usury (see Fleischmant
v. Stern, go N. Y. IIO (1881), and Banzer v. Richter, 68 Misc. 192,
123 N. Y. Supp. 678 [191o]). Is not, therefore, the opposite result attained by the court in the Florsheim case (supra) untenable? It must remain a matter of regret that Mr. Bradbury has
not favored us with his opinion on this question.
The head-note to Speedwell Motor Car Co. v. Boyce (Sup. Ct.,
1913), at page 324, is misleading. It is true the court held that a
motion for bill of particualrs may be based upon an attorney's affidavit. But the head-note is inadequate, because it omits to indicate that the court carefully limited its ruling to the "circumstances of this case." Indeed, the editor's failure to state the facts
robs the case, as reported, of practical value. But in any event the
true rule is, in our opinion, that "the affidavit of an attorney will
only be received when it is shown that he is the only person who
has knowledge of the subject-matter of the litigation, or that it is
not possible to obtain the affidavit of the party, and that the attorney has received from the party full information of the subjectmatter and makes full disclosure of what the information consists" (Mungall v. Bursley, 5P App. Div. 38o, 64 N. Y., Supp. 674
[191o]).
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